Middle East

The “Ankara–Riyadh” Axis Bypasses Israel’s Strategic Projects

Turkey–Saudi convergence is reshaping the region’s energy and transit equations.

According to Atlas of Diplomacy, an op-ed titled “The Ankara–Riyadh Axis Bypasses Israel’s Strategic Projects,” written by Qabas Zaafarani and published by Fars News Agency, offers an analytical account of how the strategic convergence between Turkey and Saudi Arabia—in the fields of energy, transit, and defense industries—backed by tacit U.S. support, has weakened Israel’s role in major regional megaprojects and pushed initiatives such as the Abraham Accords and Tel Aviv’s proposed corridors to the margins. What follows is a synopsis of that op-ed.

U.S. support, has weakened Israel’s role in major regional megaprojects and pushed initiatives such as the Abraham Accords and Tel Aviv’s proposed corridors to the margins. What follows is a synopsis of that op-ed.

At a time when Tel Aviv, banking on the normalization of relations with certain Arab governments, imagined itself as the hub of West Asia’s future energy and transit networks, new regional developments have painted a very different picture. The strategic convergence of Turkey and Saudi Arabia, with undisclosed U.S. backing, has produced a new alignment in which Israel’s proposed routes are being gradually sidelined. Hebrew-language media outlets, including Yedioth Ahronoth, have acknowledged the reality that a “Turkish Corridor” is systematically replacing the schemes Tel Aviv had pursued to link East–West energy and trade—leaving Israel increasingly isolated.

Within this framework, the fusion of Turkey’s military-technological capabilities with Saudi Arabia’s vast capital has generated an emerging alliance whose implications go well beyond bilateral cooperation. Multibillion-dollar Saudi contracts for drones, tanks, and naval equipment have turned Riyadh into a primary source of liquidity for Turkey’s defense industries, enabling Ankara to reduce its dependence on Western markets. This shift has consolidated Turkey’s position as a premier defense supplier in the Arab world and created a substitute for Israel in the Persian Gulf arms market. At the same time, the expansion of Turkey’s trade volume with Europe to nearly $170 billion annually by 2025 has further strengthened its status as an indispensable player in regional equations.

On the geopolitical plane, joint Turkish investments with Saudi Arabia and Qatar in gas infrastructure and energy transmission via Syria have made the “Turkish Corridor” model operational. This route—which facilitates the transfer of gas, electricity, and goods from the Persian Gulf to Europe—has, by virtue of being shorter and more cost-effective, effectively driven Israel’s plans to export gas via Greece and Cyprus into a dead end. As a result, Israel’s energy partnerships with Egypt and Jordan, built through years of investment, have been weakened in the face of the economic appeal of the Turkish–Saudi axis, calling into question Israel’s role as a bridge between East and West.

These developments have rendered the Abraham Accords largely ineffectual in the realms of energy and transit. Israel had relied on the assumption that Saudi Arabia, in seeking access to the West, would be compelled to pass through occupied territories; yet Riyadh’s redirection of investments toward routes traversing Turkey and Syria has invalidated that premise. The outcome has been the erosion of the India–Gulf–Europe Corridor, of which Israel was considered a central pillar—now stripped of functionality as Saudi capital exits Tel Aviv’s orbit.

Ultimately, Washington’s flexible support for the Turkey–Saudi axis has further weakened Israel’s standing. U.S. policy, aimed at bolstering regional stability, has given rise to a pole in which Israel has been reduced from an agenda-setter to a marginal player. This trajectory signals the end of Israel’s dream of becoming a regional energy and transit hub and underscores a broader reality of the new multipolar order: political agreements lacking economic and infrastructural backing are incapable of preventing the gradual exclusion of actors from major regional projects.

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