Washington imagines that a military strike can tie Iran’s hands; yet every blow activates a new field of action, response, and deterrence for Tehran.
America’s renewed threat to attack Iran appears, on the surface, to be a display of power. But at a deeper level, it reveals a recurring miscalculation in Washington’s thinking. In recent days, Donald Trump has once again spoken of the possibility of a “very hard” strike against Iran, while at the same time referring to the possibility of an agreement. This back-and-forth between military threat and the expectation of a deal shows, in itself, that the Iran issue has not ended—and cannot be ended—with a single military blow.
It appears that America’s central mistake is to assume that the military option narrows Iran’s options. Yet the experience of recent confrontations shows that every military blow, rather than tying Iran’s hands, activates new options for Tehran. The assassination of leaders highlights Iran’s capacity for institutional reproduction; attacks on infrastructure increase the possibility of regionalizing the costs; social pressure generates social deterrence; aggression against nuclear facilities strengthens the logic of hardening and dispersion; pressure on Hormuz turns geography into an Iranian political and economic lever; and an attack in the middle of negotiations produces narrative, legal, and diplomatic capital for Tehran. Therefore, the military option against Iran is not an instrument for imposing will, but an engine for producing new options for Iran.
Of course, the opposing view is clear. Supporters of military strikes argue that the United States and Israel can force Iran to retreat by assassinating commanders, destroying infrastructure, targeting nuclear facilities, exerting psychological pressure on society, and reopening the Strait of Hormuz by military force. From their perspective, military power means the ability to change the other side’s behavior by raising costs. But the problem with this analysis is that it fails to distinguish between the “ability to strike” and the “ability to achieve results.” America may be able to strike, but it cannot necessarily turn that strike into a political outcome. More importantly, every blow does not merely generate costs; it also generates options for Iran.
The first miscalculation is the personalization of power in Iran. America and Israel have repeatedly interpreted Iran through the lens of individuals, as though eliminating a commander, an official, or a key figure could alter the country’s strategic course. But power in Iran is not stored merely in individuals; it is accumulated in institutions, wartime experience, security memory, decision-making networks, and mechanisms of replacement. Assassination can create a momentary shock, but when a political and security structure possesses institutional depth, the elimination of individuals does not necessarily lead to systemic paralysis, decision-making collapse, or political surrender. In such a situation, striking leaders is not the end of power, but the beginning of its reproduction at a harder level. The option activated here for Iran is the “institutional reproduction of power.” In such a situation, assassination is a tool of elimination for the enemy, but for Iran it can become a mechanism of cohesion, security purification, strengthening of the command structure, and force reorganization. Iran’s political system does not stop with the removal of individuals; indeed, in the face of such a blow, it may act in a harder, more cohesive, and more securitized manner.
The second mistake is the assumption that surrender can be achieved through the destruction of infrastructure. Attacks on Iran’s infrastructure undoubtedly impose costs, and no serious analysis should minimize the damages of war. But the central question is whether these damages lead to a change in Iran’s strategic behavior. The experience of Iranian society has shown that external pressure, especially when accompanied by military threats, does not necessarily lead to the collapse of public will. Here, Iran’s option is the “regionalization of costs.” If the United States and Israel turn Iran’s infrastructure into a battlefield, Tehran can also move the crisis from the level of an attack on Iranian soil to the level of infrastructural security across the entire region. In such a situation, the issue is not merely a few facilities in Iran; energy, shipping, ports, insurance, supply chains, global markets, and the economic security of America’s allies all enter the calculation. An attack on Iran’s infrastructure, if sustained, will not keep the crisis Iranian; it will make it regional, energy-centered, and global. More precisely, attacking Iran’s infrastructure can lead to the infrastructuralization of the crisis across the entire region.
The importance of this issue becomes even clearer in the Strait of Hormuz. Hormuz is not merely a waterway; it is a machine for converting geography into political power. According to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in 2024 an average of about 20 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products passed through the Strait of Hormuz, equivalent to roughly 20 percent of global petroleum liquids consumption. This figure alone is enough to show that Hormuz is not merely an issue between Iran and America; it is the point where Iran’s security, the global economy, and the vulnerability of Washington’s regional allies intersect.
From here, the third mistake becomes evident: the idea of reopening straits by military force. A great power may be able to conduct operations in a strategic chokepoint for a period of time, but the sustained, secure, and economically viable reopening of a strait is difficult without recognition of the role of the coastal power. In chokepoints, geography changes the logic of power. Aircraft carriers, bombers, and fighter jets can project power, but they cannot eliminate insurance risk, fear in the energy market, the vulnerability of oil tankers, and the constraints of maritime routes. America may be able to operate in Hormuz, but it cannot rule over geography.
The fourth mistake is the belief that the nuclear issue can be ended through bombing. The nuclear program is not merely a collection of buildings and facilities; it is knowledge, human capital, technical experience, an industrial network, and a political decision. A military strike can destroy facilities or delay the program, but it cannot bomb nuclear knowledge out of existence. Even in Western analyses, this limitation has been acknowledged. Some assessments state explicitly that Iran’s nuclear materials and capabilities are located in deep underground facilities, and that conventional attacks would not necessarily lead to their certain destruction.
The option activated here for Iran is “hardening and redefining the rules.” If Iran’s nuclear facilities are targeted, Tehran can argue that peaceful nuclear infrastructure, even when defined within the framework of international law, is not immune from aggression. The result of such an attack would not be the end of Iran’s nuclear capacity, but the strengthening of the logic of dispersion, hardening in the sense of reducing flexibility, deepening, and making future infrastructure less accessible. At the same time, Iran’s position on the right to enrichment would become harder, demands for serious security guarantees would grow stronger, and any future agreement would inevitably face a deeper level of mistrust.
The fifth mistake is the hope that an external war can be transformed into an internal crisis. Washington and Tel Aviv may imagine that military pressure can turn social cleavages in Iran into political protest against the ruling structure. But this calculation does not always work. In many societies, an external threat can temporarily push internal divisions to the margins and turn the defense of the country into a point of unity. Here, an important concept takes shape: social deterrence. Society is not merely the object of war; it can also become part of the mechanism of deterrence. When society sends the message that it will not allow external pressure to become internal collapse, one of the pillars of the enemy’s calculation crumbles.
Another less-noticed option is Iran’s diplomatic and legal option. In its two recent attacks on Iran, the United States has shown that even when the path of negotiation has not been closed, it is prepared to use military tools to alter the balance of talks. This is precisely the point at which Iran’s hand becomes freer at the level of narrative and legitimacy. Tehran can argue that the main issue is not Iran’s refusal of diplomacy, but America’s use of war within diplomacy itself. Such an image changes Iran’s position in global public opinion, turning it from a country accused in the nuclear file into a country targeted in the middle of a negotiating process. This situation creates a legitimacy cost for America and produces narrative, legal, and diplomatic capital for Iran.
Therefore, America’s main problem is not a shortage of military power; it is the inability to convert military power into political results. Washington can create costs, but not every cost necessarily leads to surrender. Even the concerns of America’s regional allies begin from this very point. The warning by a senior Emirati official about the danger of renewed conflict and the need to reach an agreement shows that regional actors, too, understand that a new attack would not contain the crisis; it would make it more complex and more expansive.
From this perspective, if the next attack occurs, it will not be a sign of America’s strategic strength; it will be a sign of its inability to turn the previous attack into a political outcome. If the military option could truly close the Iran file, there would be no need for constant threats, fresh mediation, back-channel negotiations, and discussions about a more severe attack. The repetition of military threats means that the previous tool has still not produced the desired result.
The conclusion is clear: the military option against Iran is already trapped in an internal contradiction. America wants to limit Iran’s options through attack, but every attack activates new arenas for Iran’s response. Assassination activates institutional memory; attacks on infrastructure bring infrastructural deterrence into the field; social pressure creates social deterrence; attacks on the nuclear industry strengthen the logic of hardening and dispersion; and pressure on Hormuz turns geography into Iran’s political lever.
