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Atlas Diplomacy’s Interview with Seyed Mahdi Talebi, an International Affairs Researcher

The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and the United States was intended to provide a sixty-day period for negotiations and the conclusion of a final agreement. Yet the resumption of hostilities before the deadline once again exposed the profound divide between diplomacy and developments on the ground. At the same time, the expansion of attacks in southern Iran, the struggle over shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz, and the growing involvement of Oman and other regional actors have pushed the crisis into a more complex phase.

To examine the reasons behind the collapse of this pause, Washington’s objectives in the latest round of attacks, Tehran’s rationale for widening the conflict, and the scenarios facing the crisis, Atlas Diplomacy spoke with Seyed Mahdi Talebi, an international affairs researcher. Talebi views the sixty-day period less as a genuine opportunity for diplomacy than as a tactical pause for repositioning. He also believes that U.S.-China competition is casting a shadow over Washington’s calculations regarding the continuation of the war.

What follows is Seyed Mahdi Talebi’s assessment of the sixty-day period, Oman’s importance, the United States’ objectives, and the future of this confrontation.

Given the mutual distrust between the two sides and the transfer of U.S. forces and equipment into the region, the sixty-day period was clearly a pause for rest and repositioning. By openly deploying military equipment and ground forces to the region, the United States demonstrated its determination to initiate another round of conflict, this time in a different form.

Meanwhile, the Zionist regime’s advance in southern Lebanon, efforts to pursue disarmament in Iraq, and the establishment of a southern corridor on the Omani side of the strait were all measures intended to weaken Iran’s strategic cards—the very assets that had helped Tehran during the forty-day war. The United States pursued all these measures intensively, indicating that it was probably in a hurry to launch an offensive. Ultimately, Iran’s attempt to preserve its leverage over the strait, including by firing on vessels passing through the Omani corridor, brought the memorandum to an end and triggered sustained U.S. attacks.

Oman is important for two reasons. Following Trump’s threat of bombing and destruction, Muscat moved toward closer cooperation with the United States. The establishment of a southern corridor intended to undermine Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz was one manifestation of that cooperation.

At the same time, the maritime blockade depends on the presence of U.S. vessels in the Gulf of Oman, and those vessels require a port-based logistical support station. In Oman, that station is the Port of Duqm.

By concentrating on southern Iran, the United States intends to create the conditions for an assault on one or more locations in the region. These attacks target air-defense systems, military bases, bridges, and electricity and water infrastructure so that fighter jets, helicopters, and transport aircraft carrying commandos can operate without encountering resistance.

Civilian infrastructure is also being targeted, alongside information operations designed to compel residents to leave the cities. The ultimate aim is to enable the U.S. military, after issuing evacuation orders, to operate in areas with small populations or no civilian presence at all. Conducting operations while hundreds of thousands of people remain in some major cities could provoke popular resistance, increase civilian casualties, and carry serious reputational consequences.

Iran has no alternative but to continue along this path. What Tehran is doing is attacking U.S. offensive capabilities in order to disable the instruments of assault, while damaging air-defense and defensive systems to establish deterrence against Washington. The objective is to make the Americans recognize their own vulnerability and, as a result, halt their attacks.

Given the blows the United States has sustained and the large number of interceptor missiles it has expended, Washington now has two options: return to the blockade or test other alternatives. The second course is more dangerous.

The current war is an existential one. An operation on the scale of “October 7” was carried out because Hamas understood the conflict in existential terms; otherwise, such an action would have lacked justification. Officials and commanders on both sides have likewise emphasized the existential nature of the war.

The war will continue until one side loses its overall capacity for resilience. In this regard, the Zionist regime has stronger motivations to continue. The United States, however, may adopt a different policy because of its presence and involvement in other regions.

The United States needs Iran in order to contain China, while China is a continental power seeking to expand through the Belt and Road Initiative. Nevertheless, 90 percent of global trade is conducted by sea. In China’s case, between 90 and 95 percent of trade by weight moves through maritime routes, while between 70 and 80 percent of trade by value depends on the sea. Washington can therefore contain China without deploying forces inside Iran, relying instead on its presence in allied East Asian countries and its ability to threaten maritime routes.

It must also be recognized that China will need several more years to free itself from dependence on maritime routes. The United States, for its part, has only a few years in which to contain China; otherwise, the Chinese dragon will grow into a larger, uncontainable giant. Thus, during the remaining window in which China can still be contained, Beijing’s dependence on maritime routes will persist. Under these circumstances, it would be damaging for the United States to exhaust its capabilities in Iran, which forms part of China’s overland route.

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