Are negotiations between Iran and the United States a sign of movement toward an agreement, or merely a mechanism for managing a crisis ahead of a larger confrontation? Answering this question cannot be achieved by reference to daily events alone; rather, it requires a simultaneous understanding of three levels of transformation: the changing nature of the threat, the evolution of the concept of the “region,” and the decision-making logic of the principal actors. Within such a framework, recent negotiations are less the beginning of conflict resolution than an indication of entry into a new phase of the “suspension of political decision-making”—a phase that, if not elevated to the level of genuine decision-making, may activate the logic of war.
The first point in understanding the current situation is the distinction between “negotiation as a tool for tension management” and “negotiation as a mechanism for conflict resolution.” In the literature of conflict resolution, indirect, limited negotiations lacking a clear framework are typically designed to reduce the immediate costs of a crisis, not to resolve disputes at their roots. From this perspective, ambiguity in the agenda, the level of talks, and the venue of dialogue is itself a sign of the absence of political will for strategic decision-making.
The reality is that recent negotiations are governed less by the logic of “problem-solving” than by the logic of “buying time.” The United States seeks to acquire legitimacy for imposing greater pressure [on Iran], while Iran attempts to distance itself from the accusation of being unwilling to negotiate. The result of this situation is the emergence of a kind of symbolic diplomacy that neither leads to a sustainable agreement nor prevents the escalation of structural tensions.
At the second level of analysis, one must point to a fundamental error in the calculations of certain American decision-makers. The core assumption behind these calculations is that Iran can be contained through a model similar to Venezuela: a limited strike, economic pressure, and then the imposition of an agreement. This assumption is flawed in several respects.
First, unlike Venezuela, Iran possesses an extensive network of regional influence—a network stretching from Iraq and Lebanon to Yemen and the Red Sea. Second, the structure of power in Iran is not merely political, but a combination of ideological legitimacy, military capacity, and institutional cohesion. Third, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is not only a military force, but also an economic and security actor with the ability to exert influence at regional and transregional levels. Fourth, Iran’s geoeconomic position in the global energy market, particularly in connection with China, turns any attempt to control oil flows into an issue that goes beyond a bilateral conflict.
From this perspective, the notion of a “rapid strike and Iran’s submission” is less grounded in geopolitical realities than it is a product of the illusion of power generated by limited military actions. Historical experience likewise shows that whenever conflict with Iran has been elevated to the level of an existential threat, Tehran’s response has shifted from the logic of limitation to the logic of expanding the battlefield.
Another major transformation in the current equation is the redefinition of the concept of the “region.” In the classical view, the region refers to a specific geographical area; but in Iran’s strategy, the region signifies a multilayered arena comprising three levels: military geography, networks of allies, and the sphere of social and ideological mobilization.
At the geographical level, the region includes the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, and vital energy corridors. At the network level, the presence of actors aligned with Iran in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and other locations creates the possibility of expanding war across multiple fronts. At the social level, anti-American and anti-Israeli public opinion in the Islamic world and beyond possesses the capacity to transform the conflict into a transnational confrontation.
Within this framework, “regional war” means the transfer of confrontation from the level of states to a networked, multi-front arena—a war that engages not only military bases but also energy infrastructure, shipping lanes, and U.S. allies. This is precisely the point that has alarmed many regional actors; because regime change in Iran, contrary to initial assumptions, does not necessarily lead to greater stability, but can fundamentally reconfigure the regional order.
One of the key features of the current situation is the emergence of a kind of paradox among regional countries. On the one hand, these countries fear the outbreak of a large-scale war between Iran and the United States, because such a war would threaten their energy security and economic stability. On the other hand, they are also concerned about an agreement that would strengthen Iran’s position in the region. Moreover, the scenario of regime change in Iran is likewise undesirable for many of them, because it could turn Israel into the dominant regional actor and weaken the traditional role of regional powers.
This very paradox has led to the formation of competing lobbying efforts in Washington—a competition in which Israel and certain regional countries seek to influence U.S. calculations. The result is an intensification of hesitation in U.S. decision-making: hesitation between a large-scale war, limited strikes, or the continuation of minimal negotiations.
At the theoretical level, the current situation can be described as a “suspension of political decision-making.” In this condition, neither side is prepared to bear the costs of a final decision, yet the continuation of the status quo gradually becomes untenable. The experience of protracted conflicts shows that under such circumstances, if negotiation does not move from the symbolic level to the level of real decision-making, the arena is ceded to non-political logics.
In other words, war in this framework is not necessarily the result of a deliberate decision, but rather the structural consequence of diplomatic deadlock. When negotiations become a tool for postponing decisions, the crisis is not resolved; instead, the costs of indecision gradually increase. In such a situation, any limited incident can become the spark for a broader confrontation.
The overall analysis shows that the Iran–U.S. conflict has entered a stage in which three simultaneous trends are taking shape: the deepening of the strategic rift, the expansion of the arena of confrontation, and the continuation of minimal negotiations. These three trends appear contradictory on the surface, but in reality share a common logic: the postponement of the final decision.
The core issue is no longer merely Iran’s nuclear program or political disagreements, but the redefinition of the regional order and the positions of its actors. Within this framework, Iran is neither an actor that can be contained through limited strikes nor a party that can be forced into rapid submission. Conversely, the United States also faces serious constraints in controlling the consequences of a large-scale war.
Therefore, negotiation and war are not equivalent options; negotiation is the last mechanism for preventing the activation of the logic of war. But if negotiations remain at the symbolic level and are not elevated to real decision-making at the highest level of power, the likelihood that political suspension will turn into military confrontation is greater than what is declared in official calculations.
Ultimately, the current equation can be summarized as follows: war may begin with a decision, but its end will not be in the hands of any of the actors. It is this reality that has turned negotiations into a strategic necessity—a necessity that, if not properly understood, will push the region into a phase of instability whose control will be beyond the capacity of all actors.
