Ankara is seeking to contain the repercussions of a potential war in its eastern neighborhood.
According to Atlas of Diplomacy, an analytical note titled “Ankara’s Realism Behind the Scenes of Mediation Between Iran and the United States,” written by Ehsan Fallahi and published by the Tehran Institute, adopts an analytical and nonpartisan lens to demonstrate that Turkey’s active mediation between Tehran and Washington does not stem from symbolic or pacifist considerations. Rather, it is grounded in realist political, security, and economic calculations, aimed at preventing the spillover of the consequences of a potential war against Iran into Turkey’s national security environment and the regional balance of power. What follows is a summary of that note.
On January 30 [10 Bahman], Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, held non‑public talks in Istanbul with his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan, as well as with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The visit took place amid intensified rhetoric by Donald Trump and the deployment of U.S. naval forces to the region. These developments elevated Turkey’s mediation initiative between Tehran and Washington as a significant opportunity. Erdoğan’s subsequent phone call with Masoud Pezeshkian and his proposal to hold immediate negotiations in Turkey indicated that this move was driven less by symbolism and more by practical and realist considerations, given that the outbreak of war would carry direct and wide‑ranging consequences for Turkey.
On the political front, Iran and Turkey—despite longstanding disagreements and rivalry in Syria—are compelled to cooperate within the tense environment of West Asia. Even after the weakening of Tehran’s longtime ally by forces backed by Ankara, certain forms of regional cooperation between the two countries continued. At the same time, following the rise of al‑Julani [leader of Hay’at Tahrir al‑Sham], a large portion of Syria’s military infrastructure was destroyed by Israel, pushing Turkish‑Israeli differences into a sensitive new phase. Under these circumstances, Turkey faces a security dilemma and views the delegation of responsibility for confronting Israel to the Islamic Republic of Iran as part of the solution to this situation.
Within this framework, since early 2025, assessments have been conducted regarding Turkey’s potential use of several Syrian air bases—including the T4 airbase near Homs and the Hama airbase—for the deployment of forces and air‑defense systems, as part of an agreement with the government in Damascus. Turkish military delegations visited these bases several times; however, only hours after one such visit, Israeli fighter jets heavily bombed these facilities, rendering the T4 base effectively unusable. These developments heightened Ankara’s concerns about the expansion of Israel’s operational scope. From this perspective, preventing war and preserving the capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a counterweight to Israel serves a clear political function for Turkey by dispersing Tel Aviv’s strategic focus.
From a security standpoint, any military confrontation against Iran increases the risk of insecurity spilling over into Turkey’s eastern Kurdish regions. An escalation in the activities of groups such as PJAK [Party for a Free Life of Kurdistan], the expansion of arms and drug trafficking, and the creation of new corridors for armed networks are among the likely consequences. Accordingly, Turkey’s official doctrine toward Iran is built around preventing structural collapse, since instability in Iran could activate a chain of ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and a black economy across the region, directly threatening Turkey’s security. Moreover, a large‑scale U.S. war against Iran could—similar to the Iraq and Syria scenarios but on a much larger scale—disrupt the regional order and create opportunities for rival actors, including Russia, to expand their influence near Turkey’s borders.
In the economic and social dimensions, a U.S. attack and ensuing instability in Iran could trigger a new wave of migration from Turkey’s eastern borders which, given Iran’s population size, would be incomparable to the Syrian crisis and would impose heavy costs on Turkey. Iran supplies approximately 15–16 percent of Turkey’s natural gas needs via pipeline, and any insecurity inside Iran could increase Turkey’s energy import costs. Furthermore, bilateral foreign trade between the two countries is estimated to exceed $10 billion in 2025, with Iran serving both as an export market and as a supplier of minerals and petrochemical products for Turkey. Overall, Ankara’s mediation is pursued within a realist framework, aimed at containing unintended costs and preserving the regional balance of power.
