Instead of military war, America is pursuing psychological warfare against Iran.
According to Atlas of Diplomacy, an analytical op‑ed titled “What Will America Use to Attack Iran?”, written by Hamed Movaffaq Behroozi and published by Fars News Agency, argues that the United States—rather than seeking a direct military confrontation with Iran—has focused on a strategy of psychological attrition, power image‑making, and the production of social anxiety. In the author’s view, this strategy is less costly, more effective, and ultimately riskier than hard war, with the objective of undermining the cognitive cohesion of Iranian society. What follows is a précis of the piece.
Over recent years, the United States has sought to exert psychological pressure on Iran by amplifying the “image of war” and, through the constant display of military threats—such as the presence of warships, the raising of issues like disintegration, assassinations of officials, and security scenarios—has attempted to keep the mental space of Iranian society in a constant state of agitation. This approach has been pursued by persistently saturating the media environment with news of U.S. military movements, reinforcing a sense of insecurity and instability. Within this framework, certain media networks continuously speak of an “imminent attack,” highlighting details such as naval deployments, refueling operations, equipment positioning, the release of flight imagery, and even claims regarding the existence of “final target lists.”
Against this backdrop of manufactured tension, the hypothesis of an actual war is raised. In recent months, Iran—during a direct confrontation—forced Israel, despite all its claims and capabilities, into retreat. Under such conditions, the role of an American warship can at best be described as that of a heavily equipped floating garrison. This raises a fundamental question: can threatening a country like Iran with one or two floating military garrisons truly be decisive?
Israel, despite possessing advanced equipment and despite having occupied territory in the region that provided limited ground‑maneuver space, was unable to withstand Iran’s blows for more than two weeks. This leads to a further question: what fundamentally different capability do American warships possess that Israel did not?
On this basis, the argument is advanced that it would suffice for the very first Iranian missile to leave a visible mark on the hull of one of these vessels. The dissemination of even a single image of such an event could deliver a serious blow to America’s standing. U.S. global dominance rests less on actual warfare than on the construction of an image of power, and damage to this image would carry heavy, irreparable reputational consequences. The Yemen experience is recalled within this framework as well—where the withdrawal of the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman from the region occurred in such a way that not even a clear and decisive image was released to prove its intact condition.
Acknowledging the reality that mutual strikes are unavoidable in any war, the article emphasizes that war with Iran would be high‑risk, high‑cost, and unlikely to yield a favorable outcome for the United States. Nevertheless, U.S. military movements and certain claims put forward by Donald Trump have created, in the minds of a segment of society, the perception that war is imminent. Whether war occurs or not remains open to debate, but there exist serious and compelling reasons that deter the United States from initiating a war against Iran.
At the center of this discussion lies a project described as “attrition through fear and anger.” The aim of this project is the mental collapse and psychological erosion of Iranian society, so as to intensify feelings of exhaustion, anxiety, insecurity, and economic deadlock. This condition is at times assessed as more dangerous than war itself. Hard war imposes heavy costs on America, but mental attrition is faster, cheaper, and more profitable. Even assuming the possibility of war, this attritional project is presented as certain and already underway. Confronting it requires a documented and continuous narrative of battlefield reality—a narrative that reflects America’s and Israel’s defeat after more than twenty years of preparation in a twelve‑day battle, their request for a ceasefire, postwar efforts to exert livelihood pressure and create social fissures, alongside public reactions and America’s renewed retreat—because today’s battle, above all else, is a battle of narratives and minds.
