A new configuration of power in the Persian Gulf is becoming more visible.
According to Atlas of Diplomacy, an op-ed titled “The Alignment of the Israeli Axis in the Persian Gulf Against Saudi Arabia,” written by Ghabas Zafarani and published to Atlas of Diplomacy, an op-ed titled “The Alignment of the Israeli Axis in the Persian Gulf Against Saudi Arabia,” written by Ghabas Zafarani and published by Fars News Agency, examines the gradual formation of a security–political axis between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, an axis whose objective is assessed as redefining the regional balance of power and exerting indirect pressure on independent Arab actors—most notably Saudi Arabia. This axis, going beyond traditional disputes, is based on emerging alliances and long-term engineering of the regional security order. What follows is a précis of this op-ed.
Developments in the Persian Gulf in recent years—from the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain, to the events following Operation al‑Aqsa Flood [the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 attack] and the Gaza war—have consistently occupied the center of geopolitical attention. However, the set of developments in recent weeks, particularly those coinciding with Mohammed bin Zayed, President of the UAE, visiting India, are viewed as signaling the region’s entry into a new phase.
The significance of this juncture has increased in light of the intensification of UAE–Saudi rivalry in southern Yemen and Abu Dhabi’s failure to impose its demands on Riyadh. At the same time, the agreements announced during this visit and parallel movements—including visits by Pakistani officials to Saudi Arabia—indicate that previously concealed differences are gradually transforming into overt regional and extra-regional alignments. Within this framework, the publication of documents regarding Bahrain’s positioning alongside the UAE, India, and Israel, as well as directional reporting by the newspaper Al‑Arab, point to an effort to convey the message that the scope of pressure is not limited to Saudi Arabia alone, and that countries such as Kuwait, due to their alignment with Riyadh, are also exposed to pressure.
Taken together, these trends indicate the Persian Gulf’s entry into a new stage—one that no longer relies solely on the traditional Arab–Israeli conflict or intra–Gulf Cooperation Council rivalries, but rather on emerging alliances, overlapping security interests, and long-term power‑engineering projects.
Within this context, growing signs point to the formation of a security–political axis between Israel and the UAE, aimed at gradually redefining the balance of power in the Arab world. The starting point of this alignment lies in the Abraham Accords, where the UAE and Bahrain, by normalizing relations with Israel, moved beyond the traditional framework of Arab consensus on the Palestinian issue. This step is regarded as a signal of entry into a new security order, in which Israel emerges as an accepted actor within the Persian Gulf’s security architecture, with the United States playing the role of facilitator.
In this new order, the UAE has sought to secure the position of Israel’s pivotal partner in the Persian Gulf, leveraging its economic and diplomatic capacities to act as an intermediary between Tel Aviv and other Arab capitals. Bahrain, due to its security dependence and fragile political structure, has rapidly fallen into line with this trajectory. By contrast, Saudi Arabia has thus far refrained from formally joining this process, and this hesitation has gradually come to be viewed as a strategic challenge.
Cooperation between Israel and the UAE has gone beyond economic and intelligence domains, expanding into security intelligence sharing, cyber cooperation, alignment of regional policies, and indirect influence over the internal equations of certain Arab states. This model aligns with a preference for smaller, more flexible actors, with the UAE assuming the role of a regional executor within this framework.
Developments in Bahrain and Kuwait can also be examined through this lens. Bahrain has entered the orbit of this axis, whereas Kuwait—due to its parliamentary structure and the sensitivities of public opinion—has adopted a more cautious approach and views itself as aligned with Saudi Arabia. This alignment, although not the product of a single factor, carries indirect messages to larger actors. Saudi Arabia, possessing geographic, demographic, economic, and religious depth, remains an unresolved variable and, in some readings, is regarded not as the final partner but as the target of a long-term process of power calibration and containment. Overall, current developments reflect a confrontation between two geopolitical logics, one that may lead to a redefinition of roles and an intensification of influence competition in the Persian Gulf.
