Tom Barrack’s appointment as the U.S. president’s special envoy for Syria and Iraq, while he remains U.S. ambassador to Turkey, is not merely an administrative adjustment. Placing three portfolios in the hands of one figure suggests that Washington is seeking greater coordination among its policies toward Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. In this view, the three countries are not separate files, but parts of an interconnected security and economic space, where developments in one corner affect the other two.
This does not prove that a fully developed blueprint was designed in advance. Still, the available signs point to something beyond bureaucratic coordination. In Syria, Barrack’s role in supporting a ceasefire arrangement and the gradual integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into the central state structure indicates that, at least in this case, U.S. policy has moved away from relying solely on a non-state partner and toward strengthening the capacity of the formal state. His involvement in a process that culminated in the signing of a major energy project in Damascus, involving Qatari, Turkish, and American companies, further highlights the link between security, reconstruction, and the economy. His appointment should therefore be understood as evidence of an effort to bring these spheres closer together, not as definitive proof that Washington has already mapped every detail of the region’s future order.
This approach can be explained through two concepts. The first is offensive realism, which emphasizes the efforts of great powers to prevent the emergence of consequential rivals. The second is state-building, which rests on the concentration of the means of violence in the hands of formal institutions. Put simply, the objective is not only to contain an immediate crisis, but to reshape the environment in which crises are produced and reproduced.
Iraq: The Main Test of Power Concentration
Iraq is the most important arena for testing this approach. In Baghdad, the question of the “state’s monopoly on weapons” is not merely a technical or legal matter; it bears directly on the balance of power within the country’s political structure. The more capable central institutions become in making decisions and exercising authority, the narrower the room for independent armed actors becomes. From this perspective, strengthening the central government is consistent with consolidating national sovereignty, but in practice, it can also rearrange the balance among domestic forces.
The importance of this process is magnified by Iraq’s economic structure. World Bank estimates for 2025 indicate that oil accounted for roughly 88 percent of Iraqi government revenues, a dependency that leaves the country vulnerable to market fluctuations, export disruptions, and external pressure. Under such conditions, security-sector reform cannot be separated from the economy. A state with highly centralized financial resources, but incomplete control over coercive instruments, remains more fragile in the face of political and security crises.
The transition of the coalition mission in Iraq must also be viewed through this lens. The Pentagon had previously announced that the first phase of the coalition mission in Iraq would conclude by September 2025. Yet official Defense Department and U.S. Central Command documents indicate that security cooperation, counter-ISIS coordination, and the linkage between the Iraqi and Syrian files remain on Washington’s agenda. CENTCOM’s 2026 status report also emphasizes the continued activity of coalition forces against ISIS in both countries. The end of one form of coalition presence, therefore, does not necessarily mean the end of Washington’s ability to shape events; it may instead mean a shift in the tools and channels through which influence is exercised.
Not every overlap between security debates, institutional reforms, and pressure for financial transparency should be treated as evidence of a fully coordinated plan. Even so, the combination of these instruments can contribute to a gradual shift in Iraq’s internal balance of power. The reality on the ground is more complicated than any political directive can resolve. Some armed groups have been incorporated into formal structures, while others continue to insist on operational independence. For that reason, the project of concentrating power, even with outside backing, will encounter political, social, and security resistance.
Syria, Turkey, and the Competition Over Regional Order
A change in priorities is also visible in Syria. Pressure to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces into central institutions, along with U.S. support for negotiating mechanisms, suggests that the center of gravity in Washington’s policy has shifted from a purely tactical relationship with local actors toward rebuilding a formal state that can be engaged with. This does not mean the complete removal of non-state actors. But the message is clear: a more capable central government can narrow the maneuvering space available to armed groups and proxy rivalries.
Turkey is the geographic, security, and energy link in this equation. The U.S. Energy Information Administration views Turkey, because of its growing role in transporting oil and gas to Europe, as one of the key energy routes connecting Central Asia and the Middle East to European markets. Meanwhile, formal U.S.-Turkish discussions on Syria’s stability and security suggest that Damascus, Ankara, and Washington do not see these files as separate. Syria has not yet become a stable transit corridor, but the multinational energy project in Damascus shows that security and economic reconstruction are gradually becoming intertwined across the region.
From this perspective, Barrack’s outlook is not solely security-driven. The more economic, energy, and reconstruction networks are woven together among states, the higher the cost of instability becomes for regional actors. This logic does not necessarily lead to durable peace, but it can serve as a tool for managing tensions and shaping governments’ choices. For Washington, such linkages also offer a way to influence regional order without relying exclusively on an expansive military presence.
This strategy must also be read in the context of the larger competition between the United States and Iran, Russia, and China. At the security level, strengthening partner governments and constraining armed actors can reduce the scope of regional rivals’ influence. At the economic level, energy projects and market connectivity may alter transit options and the calculations of outside powers, including China within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. At the political level, the success or failure of this approach will show the extent to which Washington can still shape the rules of the game.
The opposing view deserves serious consideration. Some argue that the United States no longer has the capacity to design regional order, and that appointments of this kind are less strategic than performative, reflecting the residue of past influence. That skepticism is not without basis. Iraq and Syria have repeatedly shown that local actors, internal fractures, and competition among external powers can constrain any outside design. But an inability to impose a complete order is not the same as irrelevance. Washington can still alter the incentives and costs facing regional actors through security cooperation, sanctions, political legitimation, coordination with regional partners, and the facilitation of investment. Its engagement with Damascus and the connection of that engagement to energy reconstruction show that diplomatic and economic instruments remain part of American power in the region, even if they do not guarantee the final outcome.
Taken as a whole, Barrack’s appointment should not be treated as proof of a certain transition to a new regional order. It is better understood as a test of a more integrated regional policy, one that places the strengthening of central governments, the containment of armed actors, security cooperation, and energy and reconstruction linkages within a single frame. The project’s success is far from assured. Iraq and Syria continue to face institutional weakness, internal divisions, and rival actors, while Iran, Russia, and China also remain active parts of the regional equation. Still, the concentration of several portfolios in the hands of one representative, alongside parallel security and economic developments, indicates that Washington is seeking not merely to manage the rules of the game in West Asia, but to redefine them, at least in part. Where that effort ultimately leads remains unclear.
Ali Rahimipour, M.A. in International Relations and Defense Management
