By strengthening the middle corridor and pursuing proactive diplomacy in the Gulf, Turkey is seeking a role as the hub of trade and security in West Asia. In recent years, through a multilateral foreign policy, Ankara has reinforced its position as a key actor in international relations. By investing in infrastructure projects, engaging in active diplomacy with Gulf states, and participating in sensitive issues such as the reconstruction of Gaza, Turkey aims to expand both its economic and political influence. These initiatives position Turkey as a commercial bridge linking Europe, Central Asia, and West Asia, while simultaneously establishing it as an alternative security power amid the waning role of the United States. However, this expansion of influence comes with challenges, including tensions with Israel and potential alignment with Russian and Iranian interests. This analysis, drawing on multiple sources, examines how Turkey is reconstructing its role in the South Caucasus, West Asia, and beyond.
Turkey’s Infrastructure Projects: Strengthening Connectivity in the South Caucasus and the Middle Corridor
Through major investments in transport infrastructure, Turkey aims to become the primary commercial connectivity hub across continents. A key project is the Eastern Turkey railway development, with a budget of approximately $1.615 billion, which upgrades the Divriği–Kars–Georgia border railway line. The project includes electrification, installation of advanced traffic management systems, and a 320-kilometer-long audio monitoring network. Additionally, the construction of bridges, tunnels, and new stations increases freight capacity and supports economic growth in eastern Turkey. On September 25, the Turkish government published a document inviting international investors to participate.
This project is part of a broader plan to strengthen the Trans-Caspian or Middle Corridor, linking the Black Sea to Central Asia. On January 5, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the construction of the Samsun–Trabzon–Sarp high-speed railway, connecting Ankara via Ordu, Giresun, Trabzon, Rize, and Artvin to Georgia. This line is part of the larger Ankara–Kırıkkale–Çorum–Samsun project, facilitating transport from central Turkey to the Black Sea. Georgia is also contributing through the 11.3-kilometer Batumi–Turkey highway, much of which passes through tunnels.
These projects not only enhance trade but could align with Russian interests. The new lines bring Turkey closer to the breakaway region of Abkhazia, where the Abkhazia railway has been inactive since the 1990s. Restoring this line could connect Turkey and Russia through the South Caucasus via a route only 150 kilometers long, enabling Russia’s access to Armenia and Iran, while Russia already links with Iran via Azerbaijan and the North–South corridor. A recent meeting of representatives from Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia aimed to increase trade to 15 million tons via this corridor, highlighting its strategic importance. Iran is also focused on completing the Astara–Rasht segment, while Georgia’s Kooshati–Kobi road project (valued at $500 million) facilitates trade between Russia and Armenia.
Analytically, these projects position Turkey to reduce dependence on Western trade routes and cooperate with powers such as Russia and Iran. While this approach appears primarily economic, it carries political implications. Turkey could serve as a mediator in South Caucasus tensions, yet cooperating with Russia—which supports Abkhazian separatism—could heighten friction with Georgia and the West. These transport links have the potential to double Middle Corridor trade, though they require political stability in the region.
The Emergence of a New Security Order: Erdoğan’s Gulf Diplomacy
President Erdoğan’s three-day visit to Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman from October 21–23 focused not only on bilateral relations but also on broader regional issues. The signing of 24 agreements, memoranda of understanding, and joint statements in economic, political, and defense sectors underscores the depth of these relations. Core topics included Gaza, the ceasefire, reconstruction, and the integration of a new Syrian government following the December 8 revolution. The visit, immediately after the Sharm El-Sheikh peace summit in Egypt, emphasized the implementation of the ceasefire and the role of Gulf states in stabilizing Gaza.
Discussions focused on uninterrupted humanitarian aid, deployment of international peacekeeping forces, reconstruction of Gaza, and post-war governance frameworks. The economically capable Gulf states play a key role in reconstruction. Turkey, as an active mediator alongside Qatar in ceasefire negotiations, emphasized maintaining peace and preventing Israeli violations. This shared stance could increase pressure on the United States to hold Israel accountable. The integration of a new Syrian government into the region is also critical for Gulf states, as strengthening economic ties with Syria reinforces regional stability.
Israel’s expansionist policies, particularly the September 9 attack on Qatar, shifted Gulf security perspectives. Despite U.S. assurances, the attack was perceived as a direct threat, prompting states toward new alliances, such as a Saudi–Pakistan defense partnership. Turkey, with its robust defense industry and operational experience in conflict zones, has emerged as a key security provider.
Significantly, Turkey strengthens its position amid a security vacuum created by the diminishing U.S. role. Changes in U.S. regional policy are pushing Gulf states toward regional powers like Turkey. Erdoğan’s direct diplomacy invites all countries to participate responsibly in regional security, transforming Turkey from a peripheral actor to a central power.
Challenges to Turkey’s Role in Gaza: Critical Perspectives and Security Red Lines
While Turkey pursues a mediating and reconstruction role in Gaza, some critical perspectives accuse it of contributing to instability. Critics argue that the presence of Turkish forces could constitute a red line for Israel, as Erdoğan-led Turkey may not only fail to stabilize the region but could exacerbate tensions. This perspective emphasizes that Turkey’s support for Hamas and anti-Israeli policies threatens peace.
This critique fits within a broader framework: as a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and an opponent of Israel, Turkey might steer Gaza’s reconstruction toward more radical ideologies. Repeated Israeli ceasefire violations reinforce Turkey and Gulf states’ common stance, yet the deployment of Turkish forces raises the risk of direct confrontation. From a security standpoint, Israel prefers U.S. guarantees; however, given shifts in U.S. policy, this posture may isolate Israel diplomatically.
The analysis indicates that Turkey’s role in Gaza aligns with Gulf diplomacy (focused on peace and reconstruction) but conflicts with Israeli interests. This tension forms part of the emerging security order in which Turkey seeks to fill a vacuum, albeit with the risk of Western isolation.
Overall Analysis: Turkey’s Political Balance and Future Outlook
Through South Caucasus projects, Turkey strengthens connectivity along the Middle Corridor and facilitates cooperation with Russia for access to Iran and Central Asia. This complements the North–South Corridor and diverts trade from traditional routes. In the Gulf, Turkey’s diplomacy positions it as a security partner, where reduced dependence on the United States creates opportunities for its defense industry.
However, the Gaza challenge highlights limits: Turkey’s influence can facilitate peace, yet some perspectives see it as destabilizing. These initiatives are part of Erdoğan’s “strategic depth” approach, freeing Turkey from NATO dependence and advancing multilateral policies. Regional impacts include increased trade (potentially doubling Middle Corridor throughput), stabilization in Syria and Gaza, but also the risk of tensions with Israel and Georgia.
Turkey’s future role as a hub of connectivity and regional security depends on completing projects like the Eastern Turkey railway by 2030 and managing relations with competing powers. With careful balancing, Turkey could become a central regional power, but it must navigate the risk of new conflicts.
