Iran can limit the impact of U.S. sanctions by expanding non-dollar trade.
According to Atlas Diplomacy, an article titled “Jeffrey Sachs Warns Iran Against Trusting U.S. Commitments,” written by Reza Hosseini and published by Fars News Agency, focuses on Jeffrey Sachs’s views regarding sanctions and Iran’s frozen assets. It argues that Tehran should avoid surrendering strategic concessions in exchange for U.S. financial promises and should instead reduce its vulnerability to pressure from Washington by expanding non-dollar trade and strengthening economic relations with Asian partners. What follows is a summary of the article.
The economic approach outlined in the article rests on the assumption that Washington applies financial pressure primarily through two channels: freezing Iranian assets and imposing unilateral, extraterritorial sanctions on companies and countries that cooperate with Tehran. Within this framework, the seizure of Iran’s financial resources is regarded as lacking an acceptable legal basis. Yet recovering those assets should not become an objective for which Iran retreats from its security and strategic interests. Even if the release of frozen funds is placed on the negotiating table, the record of U.S. conduct suggests that relying on political promises without enforceable guarantees can prove costly.
From an economic standpoint, the U.S. market does not occupy a decisive place in Iran’s foreign trade. Most of Iran’s commercial exchanges take place with China, Russia, India, and other Asian economies, and this pattern provides an opportunity to reduce dependence on the financial network controlled by Washington. Expanding oil and commodity exports to Asian markets, using national currencies, pursuing barter arrangements, and establishing independent payment mechanisms could neutralize part of the sanctions’ impact. Along this path, China serves simultaneously as an export market, a supplier of goods and technology, and a potential partner in building non-dollar financial infrastructure.
At the same time, U.S. sanctions pressure has consequences that extend beyond the Iranian economy. Washington’s repeated use of the dollar, the banking system, and asset seizures as instruments of coercion has weakened other governments’ confidence in the security of the U.S.-dominated financial order. The more countries face the threat of secondary sanctions or the confiscation of their assets, the stronger their incentive becomes to develop alternative payment networks. As a result, the very instruments used to preserve U.S. financial dominance may, over the long term, accelerate the movement of major economies away from the dollar.
The proposed strategy for Iran centers on deepening trade, investment, and financial relations with Asian partners. This orientation does not mean disregarding Iran’s claims regarding its frozen assets. Rather, it distinguishes between pursuing the legal recovery of those resources and conceding fundamental strategic interests. Tehran can continue seeking the return of its property through international channels while preventing the issue from being turned into leverage for forcing retreats on security matters. Diversifying economic partners and payment routes would also reduce the Iranian economy’s vulnerability to unilateral U.S. decisions. At the political and social levels, the Resistance displayed by Iran and Lebanon is presented as a factor exposing the limits of American and Israeli power. The spread of antiwar sentiment in American society suggests that a widening gap has emerged between the interventionist policies of the ruling elite and the views of segments of the public. At the same time, Iran’s image among parts of Western society has begun to shift—from that of an isolated and powerless country to that of a society with social cohesion, technological capacity, and a deep civilizational heritage. The large public turnout at the funeral ceremonies for the former leader of the Islamic Republic is likewise interpreted, within this framework, as evidence of the depth of Iran’s national identity and its capacity for social mobilization. Taken together, these factors suggest that Iran’s reliance on domestic capabilities, Asian partnerships, and non-dollar trade could raise the cost of U.S. pressure and strengthen Tehran’s bargaining position.
